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The classical notion of how we see things is that perception is passive--that the eyes are win-
dows, and in floods reality. This was how the Greeks saw perception, and it is the basis of the
accounts of the seventeenth and eighteenth century Empiricist philosophers. But physiological
work of the nineteenth century cast doubt on this view that perception is passive acceptance of
reality. The doubt arose from discoveries of elaborate neural mechanisms, of the delay of signals,
and of the time required to process the signals and then make decisions. The doubt was fueled by
interest in phenomena of visual and other illusions; for how could passively accepted truth be illu-
sory? It was clear to Hermann von Helmholtz and others and hundred years ago that illusions
suggest active processes of perception, which do not always work quite correctly or appropriately.
This discovery, and surely this was an important discovery, was not all popular with
philosophers--for perception as the principal basis for true statements became suspect. Worse,
evidently perception needed scientific backup (and indeed, what was discovered with instruments
did not always agree with how things seem to the senses), so philosophers lost out to scientists as
the discoverers and arbiters of truth. Fortunately for them, scientists often disagree on their obser-
vations, and how they should be interpreted, so philosophy gradually took on other roles, espe-
cially advising scientists what to do.
Perhaps curiously, perception is not at the present time a popular topic for philosophers. This
must be partly because scientific accounts of perception have now gone a long way away from
appearances. They depend on physiological and psycho-physical experiments (as well as curious
phenomena including various kinds of illusions) which require technical investigation and do not
fall within traditional concepts of philosophy. For example, it has become clear over the last
20 years or so that visual perception works by selecting various features from the environment, by
specialized information channels of the eye and brain. This is an extension of the nineteenth cen-
tttry physiological concept of the Specific Energies of nerves, suggested by the founder of modern
physiology Johannes Muller (1801-58). His notion that there are many special receptors and neu-
ral pathways, each giving its own distinct sensation, has recently been confirmed and extended for
touch, hot and cold, and tickle (Iggo, 1982). In vision, various features (such as the position and
orientation of edges, direction and velocity of movement, stereoscopic depth, brightness, and col-
ors) are signaled by dedicated channels having special characteristics for transmitting and analyzing
significant features of the world. There are also "spatial frequency" channels, tuned to separations
of features, which suggest that spectral analysis plays some part in pattern recognition. All this
implies that a great deal of parallel processing goes on in the visual system--leading to integrated
pattern vision in which many sources of information, sensory and stored from the past, come
together--to give powerfully predictive hypotheses, which are our reality of the object world. It
seems appropriate and useful to think of perceptions as "hypotheses" (Perceptual Hypotheses) by
analogy with the hypotheses of science which make effective use of limited data for control and
prediction (Gregory, 1974, 1981).
We may go on to ask further what, perceptually, is an object? What is accepted or seen as an
object depends greatly on use--on what is handled, or what behaves, as a unit. It seems that we
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maptheworld into individualobjectsin infancy,byexploringwithourhandsanddiscovering
whatcanbepushedor pulledasunits,andgenerallyhowthingsbehaveto usandto eachother.
Thuswhenwereadabook,eachpageis anobject,aswe turnthemseparately;butontheshelf
eachbookis anobject,astheyareselectedandpickedasaunit. And onaprintedpageletters,
words,sentences,or paragraphsmaybeunits,accordingto howweread.Perceptualunitsareset
upearlyin life, but it isaninterestingpossibilitythatnewstructuringmightbecontinuedthrough-
out adultlife--by continuingtoexploretheworldwith ourhandsandeyes.Thenwemight con-
tinuetheremarkableperceptualandintellectualdevelopmentof childhoodthroughoutlife. This is
thehope(onemightalmostsayreligion)of interactive"hands-on"sciencecenters,includingthe
Exploratorium founded by Frank Oppenheimer in San Francisco, and the Exploratory we have
started in Bristol (Gregory, 1986). They allow people of all ages to discover the world of objects
(and something of science and technology, as well as their own perceptions) by active exploration.
The importance of experience through interaction with objects was impressed upon me
25 years ago when my colleague Jean Wallace and I studied the rare case of someone (S. B.)
who, after being effectively blind from infancy, received corneal grafts in middle life. This is the
situation envisaged by John Locke, following a letter he received from his friend Samuel
Molyneux who asked, "Suppose a man bom blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to dis-
tinguish between a cube and a sphere of the same metal .... Could he distinguish and tell which
was the globe, which the cube?" Locke (1690, Bk. II, Chapt. 9, Sect. 8) was of the opinion that
"the blind man, at first, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the
cube." And later, George Berkeley (1707) said similarly that we should expect such a man not to
know whether anything was "high or low, erect or inverted.., for the objects to which he had
hitherto used to apply the terms up and down, high and low, were such only as affected or were in
some perceived by tough; but the proper objects of vision make a new set of ideas, perfectly dis-
tinct and different from the former, and which can in no sort make themselves perceived by touch."
Berkeley goes on to say that it would take a long time to associate the two. But, contrary to the
expectations of the philosophers, we found that directly after the first operation, S. B. could see
things immediately that he knew from his earlier touch experience; although for many months, and
indeed years, he remained effectively blind for things he had not been able to explore by touch. So
Berkeley's assumption that vision and touch are essentially separate is not correct; knowledge
based on touch is very important for vision. Most dramatically, S. B. could immediately tell the
time by sight from a wall clock on the hospital ward; as he had read time by touch from the hands
of his pocket watch, from which the glass had been removed so that he could feel its hands. Even
more surprising: following the operation he could immediately read uppercase, though not lower-
case letters. It turned out that he had learned uppercase, though not lowercase, letters by touch as a
boy at the Blind School from uppercase letters engraved on wooden blocks. The blind children
were given only uppercase letters, as lowercase was not used at that time for street signs or brass
plates, which it would be useful to read by touching. So the blind school had inadvertently pro-
vided the needed controlled experiment, which suggested that active exploration is vitally important
for the development of meaningful seeing in children.
Most moving, and most informative, was S. B.'s response to seeing a lathe (which he knew
from descriptions) for the first time. Shortly after leaving the hospital, we showed him simple
lathe in a closed glass case at the science museum. Though excited by interest, he made nothing of
it. Then, with the cooperation of the Museum staff, we opened the case to let S. B. touch the
lathe. As reported at the time (Gregory, 1974):
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We led him to theglasscase,whichwasclosed,andaskedhim to tell us what
was in it. He was quite unable to say anything about it, except that he thought the
nearest part was a handle. (He pointed to the handle of the transverse feed.) He
complained that he could not see the cutting edge, or the metal being worked, or
anything else about it, and appeared rather agitated. We then asked a Museum
Attendant for the case to be opened, and S. B. was allowed to touch the lathe. The
result was startling; he ran his hands deftly over the machine, touching first the
transverse feed handle and confidently naming it as a "handle," and then on to the
saddle, the bed and the head-stock of the lathe. He ran his hands eagerly over the
lathe, with his eyes shut. Then he stood back a little and opened his eyes and said:
"Now I've felt it, I can see."
S. B.'s effective blindness to objects he did not know as remarkably similar to clinical agnosia,
and to Ludwig Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of "Aspect Blindness." In our own experience (or
rather lack or it) of ambiguous figures, such as Jastrow's Duck-Rabbit--while it is accepted as a
rabbit, the duck features are scarcely seen, disappearing into aspect blindness. This is also dra-
matic in Rubin's Face-Vases, which disappear in turn, sinking into the ground of the invisibility of
aspect blindness, to emerge from nothing as materializing figures. Thus Wittgenstein (1953,
p. 213) asks of an imaginary aspect-blind person, presented with the reversing-skeleton Necker
Cube figure:
Ought he to be unable to see the schematic cube as a cube? For him it would
not jump from one aspect to another. The aspect-blind will have altogether different
relationship to pictures from ours.
We found that S. B. did not experience reversals of these (to us) ambiguous figures. For him
they were meaningless patterns of lines, and, in general, pictures were hardly seen as representing
objects. From this, I suggest (Gregory, 1981) that perceptual phenomenon of ambiguity should be
highly useful for investigating meaning and understanding.
There was evidence that he learned to conceive and perceive space, not only by handling
objects but also by walking. In the hospital ward he was able to judge distances of objects such as
chairs with remarkable accuracy. But looking down from the window--which was some 40 or
more feet high--he described the distance of the ground as about his own body height. He said
that if he hung from the windowsill with his fingers, he feet would just touch the ground. Blind
people avoid jumping down for they do not know what is (if anything!) below them; they feel care-
fully with their feet First. So he would have had little or no experience of distances below his feet,
except for stairs and occasionally ladders. We may conclude that experience of walking was
necessary for seeing distance. This is borne out by our, normal, loss of Size Scaling looking
down from a high building, when cars and people and so on look like toys, though for the same
horizontal distance they look almost their "correct" sizes.
All this is evidence that perception depends neurally on reading or interpreting sensory signals
in terms of experience and knowledge, or by assumptions (which may, however, be wrong and
misleading to produce illusions (Gregory, 1968, 1980)) of the object world. The Exploratory aim
is to amplify and extend first-hand experience to enrich perception and understanding for children
and throughout adult life. The effectiveness of the hands-on approach for teaching has been ques-
tioned. But in any case, surely capturing interest is the first essential for more formal methods to
be effective. It is hard to believe that learning has to be serious; it is far more likely that play is
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vitally importantfor primatesto learnhowto existin theworld in whichtheyfind themselves.It is
fascinatingto watchchildrenandadultsin thisplay-experimentsituationof individualdiscovery.
Althoughresearchis neededto besure,theycertainlygiveeveryindicationof thinkingandlearn-
ing by doing.
It seemsthatchildrendo not approach questions or experiments from a vacuum; they generally
have performed ideas, which may not be appropriate or coherent, but may be held robustly. They
may be discovered (both by their parent or teacher) by setting up predictions. Thus in the Explor-
atory, experiments with gyroscopes, or the Bernoulli effect, are highly surprising and so reveal
erroneous conceptions. Assumptions may of course also be discovered through questioning, and
spontaneous questions may reveal how children or adults see, or think they see. According to Jean
Piaget and several other authorities, young children hold magical notions of cause, not distin-
guishing between their own responses and the behavior of inanimate objects, and they tend to hold
Aristotelean notions of physics of motion and forces. In 1929, Piaget described children as
believing that all objects capable of movement--such as bicycles, and the sun and moon--are
alive. And Piaget reported many investigations on perception of conservation (or lack of conser-
vation) of matter, finding that most children before the age of 9, when given various shapes of a
lump of clay, do not appreciate conservation of substance. Presumably hands-on experience tends
to correct such errors; but how good are adults? A marketing trick is to use odd-shaped bottles to
make the contents look larger, which fools most people.
Do children, if implicitly, apply the scientific method to generate their understanding of the
world? This was the view of Jean Piaget (1896-1980), the greatest name in the field. Piaget came
to favour of an outright empiricism, where logic itself is learned. In The Child and Reality (1972),
Piaget proposes the following hypothesis (p. 94):
(a) That at every level (including perception and learning), the acquisition of
knowledge supposes the beginning of the subject's (child's) activities in forms
which, at various degrees, prepare logical structures; and (b) therefore that the logi-
cal structures already are due to the coordination of the actions themselves and
hence are outlined the moment the functioning of the elementary instruments are
used to form knowledge.
Piaget offers experiments to show effects of inferences during perceptual development in chil-
dren, showing that perceptions change as inferences change. For example (The Child and Reality,
p. 95): "A young child is shown briefly two parallel rows of four coins, one being spaced out
more than the other: The subject will then have the impression that the longer row has the more
coins." Piaget goes on to say that joining the corresponding coins of each row by lines, or joining
them in other ways, has different effects for different ages or stages of perceptual development.
So Piaget suggests that different inferences about the lines are made, each making the rows of
coins appear somewhat different. He also cites an experiment from his laboratory in which the
numbers 1 and 7 are shown with their tops hidden, and at different orientations. When the 1 is
tilted to the slope of the 7, it is still read as a 1 when ending a sequence likely to be a 1, but other-
wise it is seen as a 7. So probability affects perception in children.
Older children's notions are reported in Children's Ideas in Science, edited by Rosalind Driver,
Edith Guesne, and Andree Tiberghien (1985). This starts with an account by Rosalind Driver of
two 11-year-old boys in a practical class measuring the length of a suspended spring, as equal
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weightsareaddedto ascalepan. In themiddleof theexperimentoneof theboysunlockedthe
clampandmovedthetopof thespringuptheretortstand.Heexplains:
This is fartherupandgravityis pulling it downharderthefartheraway. The
higherit getsthemoreeffectgravitywill haveon it becauseif youjust stoodover
thereandsomeonedroppedapebbleonhim, it wouldjust stinghim, it wouldn't
hurthim. Butif I droppedit from anairplaneit wouldbeacceleratingfasterand
fasterandwhenit hit someoneon theheadit wouldkill him.
This revealstheboy'sview of gravity,which is notquiteours.
Whetheryoungchildrenaskabstractor philosophicalquestionshasbeenaskedby anAmerican
teacherof philosophy,GarethMatthewsin Philosophy and the Young Child (1980). As an exam-
ple, a boy who had often seen airplanes take off, disappearing in the distance, flew for the fin'st
time at the age of 4 years. After takeoff, he turned to his father and said in a puzzled voice:
"Things don't really get smaller up here."
How do children come to derive reality from appearances? Is a single dramatic experience such
as flying for the first time---or discovering that patterns of spectral lines from glowing gases cor-
respond to light from the stars--sufficient for a paradigm change of view or understanding in chil-
dren? Can adults go back to the drawing board to see the world afresh?
For looking at the details of how perception works, it is convenient to consider somewhat sep-
arately the early stages of how patterns and colors are signaled by the retina and analyzed by the
initial stages of the brain's perceptual systems, and then the cognitive (knowledge-based) pro-
cesses of selecting and testing perceptual hypotheses of the objects and situations that we have to
deal with to survive. A particular question that concerns us--and we have no clear answer--is
how the various signaled features finally come together, without obvious discrepancies. For
example, given that color and brightness are signaled by different parallel systems, why don't they
lose their registration to separate and produce spurious edges at borders of objects?
Curiously, our mammalian ancestors did not have effective color vision before the primates,
including ourselves at the top of the evolutionary tree. So it might be expected that for us bright-
ness contrast is more significant than color contrast for recognizing objects, and this is generally
so. The importance of brightness rather than color contrast is clear from the effectiveness of black
and white photography. Switching out the color of a TV set does little to impair our perception
(apart from watching snooker) except in rather special, though sometimes biologically important,
situations. From this simple experiment we can see that color is useful for spotting red berries in
green foliage, seeing through camouflage, remotely sensing the edibility of fruit and meat, which
could be a major reason why color vision developed in primate evolution. It had already devel-
oped, in various forms, in insects, fishes, and birds, but curiously it was lost for mammals, to be
reinvested in our immediate primate ancestors.
In some of our experiments, we do the converse of switching out the color of a TV set: we
remove brightness differences while preserving color contrast. This gives "isoluminant" displays,
which can be seen only by color vision because there are no brightness differences. We have
developed several techniques for producing color-without-brightness contrast, usually for a pair of
colors, such as red and green. It is important to ensure that they are set to equal brightness for
each observer, for there are individual differences of color sensitivities which, when extreme, are
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color-blindness(orbetter,"coloranomaly")which is usuallyreducedsensitivityto (so-called)red
or greenlight. For theseexperimentsit is importantthatneighboringcolorregionsdonotoverlap,
or havegaps,becausesuchregistrationerrorswouldproducebrightnessdifferencesat thecolor
borders.Soproducingtruly isoluminantdisplayspresents ometechnicalproblems(andit rarely
occursin nature),butsomeof thephenomenacanbeseenin formal colorprintingwhentheprint
hasthesamebrightnessasits different-colorbackground.Whentheprint andbackgroundhave
thesamebrightness,it isdifficult toreadandtheedgesof the lettersappear"jazzy." Theprint is
unstable,movingarounddisconcertingly.In spiteof the lossof stability,anduncertaintyof just
wheretheedgesare,thereis hardlyanylossof visualacuityasmeasuredwith agratingtest,
althoughlettersaremoredifficult to read.Thefact thatletteracuitythoughnotgratingacuityis
impairedsuggeststhatpreciseposition of edges (called "phase" information) is lost at isolumi-
nance, though separations between nearby features are signaled almost normally. Reading is par-
ticularly difficult when letters are closely spaced. They can also lose their individual identifies,
breaking up into unfamiliar units.
Losses may also be of neurally higher-level brain processes. Most striking is the appearance
(or rather, disappearance) of an isoluminant face. This can be shown best with a matrix of red and
green dots as in coarse screen printing: when the two colors are set to isoluminance, the face
immediately loses all expression and looks fiat, with meaningless holes where the eyes and mouth
should be. It no longer looks like a face: it becomes meaningless shapes. Although this is a
"subjective" observation, it is unmistakable. It is very strong evidence of drastic perceptual loss
when only color is available, for almost anything is normally accepted as a face. This, indeed,
makes the cartoonist's work possible because just a few lines can evoke an expressive face; so it is
remarkable that face perception is so completely lost with isoluminant color contrast. It is impor-
tant to note that this loss does not occur when a normal brightness-contrast picture is blurred, for
example by being projected out of focus, so this loss of face seems to be a central perceptual
phenomenon.
The kinds of losses that occur with normal observers at isoluminance are strikingly like the
clinical symptoms of amblyopia, or a lazy eye. This "artificial amblyopia" of isoluminance is con-
venient for experiments because it can be switched on and off and compared with the normal vision
in the same individual. Also, we can see what happens and compare our experience with the
reports of people who suffer from amblyopia, which is a help for at least intuitive understanding.
A further and dramatic loss is of a certain kind of stereoscopic depth. The American psycholo-
gist Bela Julesz discovered, over 20 years ago, that when slightly different random dot patterns are
presented, one to each eye, in a stereoscope, regions of dots which are shifted sideways for one
eye are seen as lying at a different distance from the rest of the dots which are not displaced. This
shows that the brain can compare meaningless dot patterns presented to the eyes and compute
depth from small horizontal shifts--which normally occurs for different distances, as the eyes
receive slightly different views as they are horizontally separated by a few centimeters. But when
the dots are, for example, green on a red background of the same brightness, this stereoscopic
depth is lost. We are now comparing this dramatic loss of stereoscopic depth for meaningless dot
patterns (which, however, is perhaps never quite complete) with what happens when there are
lines and meaningful objects presented in stereoscopic depth to the two eyes. There is some evi-
dence that edges activate different neural mechanisms from the random dots, because a few people
have "line" but not "random dot" stereo vision. Perhaps also the meaning, or object-significance,
of what is presented may be important in how the brain compares features for perceiving depth.
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Thereis acorrespondingphenomenonfor movement.Whenapairof suchrandomdot figures
arealternated,about10times/sec,andviewedwithoneor botheyes,theshifteddotregionsepa-
ratesfrom therestof thedotsandmovesfight andleft. Wefind thatwhenthedotsaresetto iso-
luminance,thedisplaceddotsarelostamongtheothersandnomovementis seen(Ramachandran
andGregory,1978).This isremarkable,becausethedotscanbequitelarge,andclearlyvisible
individually,andyet thiskind of stereodepthandmovementarelostwithoutbrightness
information.
Visualchannelsmaybeisolatedinvariousways,includingselectiveadaptationto colors
(givingcoloredafterimages);toprolongedviewingof tiltedlines(makingverticallineslook tilted
in theoppositedirection);to movement(asin the"movementaftereffect,"whichwasknownto
Aristotle). We haverecentlyfoundthatcontinuousreal movement is signaled by the same neural
channel as discontinuous apparent (or phi) movement, which may be seen when stationary lights
are switched on and off in sequence--provided the gaps in space and time of the apparent move-
ment are not too great (Gregory and Harris, 1984). When the gaps are large (greater than about
10 min arc subtended angle), movement can still be seen, but now it is signaled by a different neu-
ral channel, or cortical analyzing system. This we have found by showing that real movement can
cancel opposite-direction apparent movement. This is done by illuminating a readily rotating sector
disk with stroboscopic short flashes of light set to make it appear to rotate backwards from its true
motion, and also with a variable-intensity continuous light. This produces, say, real clockwise
movement and, at the same time, apparent anticlockwise movement of the disc. These movements
can be set to cancel, or null, but adjusting the relative intensities of the strobe and continuous
lights. At the null point there is only a random jitter, with no systematic movement. The null point
is not affected by the disturbing effect of adapting to prolonged viewing of movement. The move-
ment aftereffect affects the real and apparent movement equally, which is strong evidence that they
are sharing a common channel. The nulling of real against short-range, apparent movement occurs
even though the strobe and the continuous lights have different colors, so the eye's three color
channels share a common movement system.
There is, however, an interesting limit to the real/apparent-movement shared channel. When
the strobe's flash rate is set to give large jumps of the rotating sectors, nulling no longer occurs.
The two movements are now seen passing through each other, simultaneously. These observa-
tions indicate a shared channel for real- and short-range apparent movement, but a separate channel
for long-range movement. It is well known to cartoon film animators that the long-range move-
ment of large jumps between frames has cognitive characteristics, such as being affected by which
features are parts of the same object, or are likely to move separately.
An intriguing question is how the various sources of information from different parallel neural
channels combine to give unified perceptions of objects. Although neural channels have different
characteristics, and in spite of selective adaptations (which affect some channels but not others),
and in spite of distortions (which may be dramatic), we do not experience spurious multiple edges.
This surely requires some explanation. We suggest that misregistrations are avoided by a process
of "border-locking," such that luminance borders pull nearby color edges to meet them (Gregory
and Heard, 1979). So spatial registration discrepancies are prevented, although at the cost of some
distortions, which may be very evident. Presumably, some visual distortion of size and curvature
is not important in nature, although multiple edges, where there should be but one, would be seri-
ously confusing. So, we suggest, registration is maintained by border-locking (where color is
slave to luminance) at the cost of some distortion.
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It turnsout thattheclassicalperspectivedistortionillusions(suchastheMuller-Lyerandthe
Poggendorfillusions)remainessentiallyunchangedwhenpresentedwith theirlineshavingcolor
contrasto theirbackgrounds,andsetto isoluminance(Gregory,1976).But someillusions,not-
ablytheCafeWall illusion (GregoryandHeard,1979),whichhasnoperspective-depthfeatures,
appearundistortedwhenisoluminant.It seemsthatearlysensoryprocessingis affectedby isolu-
minance(asin theparallellinesof theCafeWall illusion),butthecognitivereading(ormisreading)
of perspectivedepthfrom converginglines,whichcangive spatialdistortions(Gregory,1974),is
unaffectedby isoluminance--itdoesnotmatterhowtheinformationarrivesfor cognition.
Recently,DavidHubelandMargaretLivingstone(1987)havefoundstrongevidencefor sepa-
ratecorticalsystemsfor representingandanalyzingluminanceandcolorinformation. It now
seemsthatcoloris primarily analyzedby blobsin thethird layerof thestriatecortex,while orienta-
tions,etc.,signaledby luminancedifferencesareanalyzedby interblobcellsatthisearlystageof
visualprocessing.On amatterof detail,wedisagreewith oneof HubelandLivingstone'sobser-
vations,for, asmentionedabove,wefind thattheperspectivedepthdistortionillusionsremainat
isoluminance;butheyclaimthattheseandall perspectivedepthdisappear.This is notourexpe-
rience,butnodoubtthisdiscrepancywill soonberesolved.
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